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CHAPTER SEVEN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: 
IMPACTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES IN  
INDIA, CHINA, AND BEYOND
Brooke Skartvedt Güven and Lise Johnson
Introduction
Mitigating and adapting to climate change will require a fundamental reorientation of our global 
economy as we move away from fossil fuels and transition to a low carbon and climate-resilient 
world. This reorientation depends on government actions to help catalyze and channel financial 
flows in new directions and away from business-as-usual practices.
International investment agreements (IIAs)—treaties that now number over 3,000 and have the 
objective of promoting and protecting cross-border investment flows—could potentially play a key 
role in these eXorts to scale up and (re)direct investments to meet climate change mitigation and 
adaptation needs. As presently drafted and interpreted, however, these IIAs represent a missed 
opportunity to advance climate change solutions and, worse, may even frustrate them. Due to the 
daunting amount of investment needed for mitigation and adaptation, and the consequent mandate 
for governments to be strategic in closing financing gaps, it is necessary to critically assess the 
climate-policy consistency of IIAs and (re)shape them accordingly.
This paper examines these issues. Beginning with a brief overview of IIAs and the challenges and 
opportunities they can pose for climate change policy generally, this paper then highlights particular 
challenges and opportunities these agreements pose for climate policy in China and India. When 
analyzing the relationship between IIAs and climate change, these two countries are important to 
examine because of their significant modern contributions and vulnerabilities to climate change; 
their active yet divergent approaches to IIAs; and their dual roles as hosts of considerable inward 
investment and homes to a large and growing cadre of major outward investors. The issues China 
and India face in terms of the intersections of climate policy and investment law are not entirely 
unique to them, but are especially visible. This visibility presents important examples of how current 
legal frameworks may hinder, but could be harnessed to advance, national action on climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. 
IIAs and Climate Change: The Promise and Perils
IIAs have been signed by most countries throughout the world. They typically require states to 
provide certain standards of protection to foreign investors including obligations to: 
•  compensate investors for any expropriation of their property, 
•  provide investors “fair and equitable treatment” (FET), and
•  treat covered foreign investors the same as, or better than, domestic investors or investors from 
other foreign countries. 
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A growing minority of IIAs also include restrictions on “performance requirements” such as 
measures requiring or incentivizing use of local goods and services, and those mandating 
“technology transfer.” 
To enable easy enforcement of these obligations, most IIAs permit foreign investors to directly 
sue their host-country government for conduct that allegedly breaches the treaty. Such claims 
can generally be used to challenge actions or omissions of any branch (e.g., executive, legislative, 
or judicial) and level (e.g., local, state/provincial, or federal/national) of government. These suits, 
referred to as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases, take place before an ad hoc panel of 
three arbitrators who are appointed and paid by the parties to the dispute. The final awards rendered 
by tribunals are subject to only minimal review and, as compared to judgments issued by national 
courts, are easier to enforce around the world. These awards carry powerful consequences as they 
frequently order states to pay foreign investors millions or even billions of dollars.
A key reason many governments have agreed to provide foreign 
investors these substantive protections and grant them access 
to ISDS is to attract foreign investment. The rationale is that by 
signing IIAs, countries provide signals to foreign investors that they 
are attractive and disciplined sites for foreigners to commit their 
capital. Studies conducted to date, however, indicate that the mere 
act of concluding an IIA is no guarantee that investment will come 
(Sachs and Sauvant, 2009). Rather, something more from the would-be host state is required such 
as a market, a low-cost and/or high quality labor force, or natural resources that the investors are 
seeking to access. Moreover, it is unclear that the legal guarantees provided by IIAs are adequate 
to compensate for broader and more systemic weaknesses in a host country’s legal and business 
environment (Sachs and Sauvant, 2009). Thus, despite their objective to promote international 
investment, IIAs are not subcient to meet that goal. To the extent that IIAs do attempt to attract 
investment, they rarely target those types of investments that would be most desirable from a 
sustainability perspective including, for instance, investment that would facilitate climate change 
mitigation or adaptation.
Even more problematically, as IIAs have been interpreted by ISDS tribunals, a wide range of 
government actions and inactions, even those taken in the public interest for purposes such as 
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, can actually run afoul of IIA commitments. When 
applying the expropriation standard, for instance, ISDS tribunals have required governments to pay 
foreign investors compensation for legislation, regulation, and court decisions that they consider to 
have unduly negative impacts on foreign investors’ property rights. The fact that a measure is taken 
in good faith and for public interest aims is generally not considered to protect governments from 
having to pay compensation. Similarly, the “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) standard has been 
interpreted to require governments to compensate investors for conduct that interferes with the 
investors’ expectations regarding future business plans and profits. Some interpretations of the FET 
obligation also declare that governments must pay foreign investors compensation for measures 
that the tribunals deem “arbitrary” or not proportionate to their purpose. As with the expropriation 
obligation, the fact that a state may be acting in good faith and in the public interest does not shield 
it from liability under the FET standard.
The range of climate change-related measures consequently vulnerable to challenge under these IIA 
provisions is extremely broad. On the mitigation side, it could include (but is by no means limited to) 
actions by governments to:
To the extent that IIAs do attempt to 
attract investment, they rarely target 
those types of investments that would be most 
desirable from a sustainability perspective ...”
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•  discontinue fossil fuel subsidies or to impose carbon taxes on fossil fuel industries;
•  include stricter emissions or other environmental standards in new laws or application of 
existing laws; 
•  enact policies or practices denying environmental permits for development, transport or use of 
coal, gas, or petroleum resources; 
•  institute planned phase-outs of certain energy sources; and 
•  implement decisions that require or result in stranding of fossil fuel reserves. 
On the adaptation side, IIA claims under the expropriation or FET provisions could be used to 
challenge actions ranging from court decisions requiring fossil-fuel industry players to compensate 
individuals and communities for causing climate-change related harms, to zoning restrictions 
limiting future development in flood-prone areas. Indeed, the potential claims are arguably limited 
only to the imagination of investors and their attorneys; the IIA system lacks rules that prevent 
investors from or penalize them for making frivolous claims, much less claims that are unsound from 
a climate policy perspective. 
The non-discrimination standards raise similar issues. Under these standards, host governments 
may treat di"erent investors or investments diXerently, but must treat foreign investors the same 
as or better than “like” domestic investors or investments or those from other countries. As the 
provisions have been interpreted by at least some ISDS tribunals, conduct that has the e"ect of 
treating covered foreign investors less favorably than “like” domestic or other foreign investors may 
breach a treaty even in the absence of any discriminatory intent. 
Foreign-owned companies have used these non-discrimination provisions in IIAs to challenge 
government decisions to enforce laws against them when similar action had not been taken against 
other firms, or to deny them permits for extractive industry projects when other projects had been 
approved. These interpretations not only threaten legitimate government exercises of enforcement 
and prosecutorial discretion (i.e., decisions by obcials regarding how to use often scarce resources 
to promote compliance with environmental or other laws); they also arguably prevent the 
strengthening of climate change and other environmental restrictions over time. If, for example, a 
foreign investor’s application for a coal-fired power plant were rejected based on concerns about 
the project’s contributions to GHG emissions, the investor could claim it was discriminated against 
in breach of the IIA if a coal-fired power plant that happened to be owned by a domestic or other 
foreign investor had previously been proposed and approved before the threats and causes of 
climate change had been properly understood and incorporated into policy decisions. 
Cases interpreting the non-discrimination standards have also successfully challenged government 
eXorts to apply diXerent fiscal regimes to investors involved in producing, using or selling 
substitutable and non-substitutable products. Ecuador, for example, was held liable for fiscal policies 
that treated exporters of oil less favorably than “like” exporters of flowers; Mexico was held liable 
for fiscal policies that treated purchasers of high fructose corn syrup diXerently than purchasers of 
sugar. These disputes highlight the potential for IIA-based suits against governments for tax regimes 
that diXerentiate among producers or users depending on climate-change considerations such 
as the type of fuel they produce, energy they use, or adaptation planning they have incorporated. 
Should a coal-fired power plant receive the same tax treatment as a solar-powered facility? Should a 
car with relatively high GHG emissions benefit from the same subsides provided for low-emissions 
vehicles? Should production of a water-intensive crop receive the same fiscal incentives as one 
appropriate for a drought-prone climate? Are the diXerent groups of power producers, cars, or 
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crops “like”? These questions are not resolved in the texts of IIAs, and previous ISDS cases provide 
no guarantee that tribunals will consider or respect the distinctions governments draw in order to 
advance climate policy aims. 
Perhaps the most emblematic sign of the threats IIAs pose to climate policies is TransCanada 
v. United States, which was filed in June 2016 under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). In that case, a Canadian firm is seeking USD 15 billion in alleged damages from the 
United States for the Obama Administration’s rejection of its proposed 
Keystone XL pipeline, a project that would transport more than 800,000 
barrels of carbon-heavy petroleum each day from Canadian tar sands 
to refineries in the Gulf Coast. According to the Obama Administration, 
approving the pipeline would undercut the US’s global leadership in the 
eXort to fight climate change. However, according to TransCanada, the 
government’s decision expropriated the company’s property, frustrated 
its expectations, and discriminated against its investment project since 
previous pipeline projects of investors from the U.S. and other countries 
had never been rejected on climate-related considerations. 
Even though TransCanada’s case clearly contravenes climate policy and the public interest, it may 
actually have strong claims according to past interpretations of IIAs. Moreover, even if TransCanada 
were to lose on the merits, its claims illustrate how investors in the fossil fuel industry may use IIAs 
to discourage or halt climate-friendly policies, or to secure payouts as governments strive to move 
away from previous, unsustainable policies. 
Another area of tension between IIAs and climate policy objectives arises from IIA restrictions 
on mandatory and incentive-based “performance requirements.” Performance requirements are 
tools governments use to require or encourage companies to source their goods and/or services 
from domestic providers, or to make certain expenditures in the host country such as expenditures 
on research and development or on employee education and training. While the advantages and 
disadvantages of these local content tools are hotly debated, they have been and continue to be 
used by countries around the world to help develop infant industries and to create and deepen the 
linkages between foreign investment and the domestic economy (albeit with varying degrees of 
success). These linkages can help ensure that foreign investment provides coveted capital, jobs, 
technology and know-how. Local content mandates or targets have also been used to make certain 
policies—such as government programs to subsidize development of renewable energy generation—
more politically attractive by helping ensure that those policies produce measurable domestic 
benefits for stakeholders. A number of IIAs, however, significantly limit the use of these tools. 
Similar local content restrictions are embedded in World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements 
including the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement) and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). These have been 
successfully relied upon to challenge eXorts by India and Canada to spur domestic development 
and production of renewable energy technologies while expanding deployment of renewable energy 
sources. Thus, restrictions on performance requirements are not entirely new in the international 
law arena. Nevertheless, when included in IIAs, these restrictions on performance requirements 
often extend beyond the prohibitions enshrined in WTO agreements and can be challenged under 
the IIAs’ investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, as well as through the IIAs’ state-to-state 
dispute settlement mechanisms. By permitting investors to challenge performance requirements 
directly, the number of potential “enforcers”—and the monetary remedies they can access—can 
 ... even if TransCanada were to lose 
on the merits, its claims illustrate 
how investors in the fossil fuel 
industry may use IIAs to discourage or halt 
climate-friendly policies, or to secure 
payouts as governments strive to move away 
from previous, unsustainable policies.”
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therefore be significantly greater under IIAs than through the WTO, which only permits states to 
raise challenges to the policies of another state. 
IIA restrictions on performance requirements also typically prohibit governments from imposing 
“technology transfer” requirements on foreign investors. While the meaning of “technology transfer” 
is not defined in IIAs, it is susceptible to broad interpretations encompassing flows of “knowledge, 
experience and equipment amongst diXerent stakeholders such as governments, private sector 
entities, financial institutions, NGOs and research/educational institutions” (IPCC, 2000). These 
flows can occur through a host of formal and informal relationships such as licensing agreements, 
training programs, collaborative research and development, and demonstration. 
IIA provisions restricting “technology transfer” requirements are arguably inconsistent with 
provisions in climate change agreements seeking to promote technology transfers and placing 
commitments on state parties to help ensure that they occur. Article 4 of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), for example, obliges developed country 
parties to “take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer 
of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly 
developing country parties.” Similarly, Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol states that, “taking into 
account their common but diXerentiated responsibilities” all parties must “[c]ooperate in the 
promotion of eXective modalities for the development, application and diXusion of, and take all 
practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to climate 
change, in particular to developing countries...” 
The arguable tensions between climate change objectives and IIA obligations are made more 
problematic by the diXerent dispute settlement mechanisms enshrined in the two legal regimes. 
Comparing the investment regime’s standards and enforcement mechanisms with those of the 
climate change regime highlights the important diXerences between the two areas of international 
law. The UNFCCC does not specifically provide for dispute settlement, and indeed avoids prescribing 
detailed climate policies and specific measures. Similarly, the Kyoto Protocol sets forth clear 
obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but leaves it to countries themselves to determine 
the best way to meet their obligations. The most recent Paris Agreement focuses on the actions and 
investments necessary to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degree 
C above pre-industrial levels, but does so based on an informal system of mitigation pledges on the 
part of parties. The climate change regime is thus less prescriptive and non-adjudicatory compared 
to the strict obligations and enforceability of the investment law regime.
As a result, when a government regulates to meet its commitments 
under the Paris Agreement, and the regulation is perceived by an 
investor to violate the government’s obligations under an IIA, the 
measure may be adjudicated by an ISDS tribunal, according to the 
standards and requirements of investor protection in the treaty. If 
IIAs were reliably interpreted as instruments designed and applied 
to protect and promote investment as a means of achieving the broader objective of advancing 
sustainable development, then IIA obligations could be read in line with and supportive of UNFCCC 
aims. But IIAs have more commonly been interpreted as having the sole purpose of promoting 
and protecting international investment, regardless of its impact on sustainability objectives, an 
approach that can result in government liability for breaching broad investor protections irrespective 
of the legitimacy for doing so from a climate policy perspective.
Importantly, IIAs could be more 
actively enlisted to play a catalytic 
role in advancing mitigation and adaptation.”
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Importantly, IIAs could be more actively enlisted to play a catalytic role in advancing mitigation 
and adaptation. There are a number of things the agreements could do in this respect, including 
incorporating commitments by state parties to:
•  cooperate on sharing and disseminating information on opportunities for investment in  
relevant projects; 
•  cooperate on development, deployment, and diXusion of relevant technologies; 
•  taking into account principles of special and diXerential treatment, provide technical, financial 
or other assistance to support investment in adaptation and mitigation; this could include 
such support as capacity building for investment promotion agencies, provision of risk capital 
and investment guarantees, and assistance in developing relevant technical, managerial and 
professional expertise.
In addition to such provisions designed to actively support investment in climate-friendly 
investments, IIAs could also be used by state parties to reduce subsidies and other supports to 
climate-unfriendly investments. Some IIAs, for example, bar or limit the use of certain government 
subsidies and could therefore be specifically used to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies.
Moreover, as is done by some government-sponsored political risk insurance providers, IIAs could 
narrow their scope so as to deny protection to investments that are inconsistent with climate 
policy objectives. In contrast to current practices in which IIAs provide all types of foreign-owned 
investments what is, in eXect, free political risk insurance, a climate-consistent approach would 
deny coverage for projects such as new coal mines and real estate projects in high-risk coastal or 
flood prone zones. Using this approach, IIAs could seek to encourage investment in climate friendly 
projects by providing qualifying investors protections against real government abuse, while ensuring 
that investments exacerbating climate change challenges would not be similarly covered and 
incentivized.
China and India: Past Practices and Future Options
For countries such as China and India, for whom both the eXects of climate change and the 
contributions of their industries are particularly notable, the challenges and opportunities presented 
by IIAs are heightened. Data from 2012 show that these two countries together accounted for 
roughly one-third of the world’s annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (World Resources 
Institute, 2014). Given their development needs, large and 
ecologically diverse territories, and sizeable populations, these 
countries’ eXorts to reduce climate risks will be complex, and 
likely expensive, tasks (Nadin, et al., eds. 2015).
Due to concerns about current levels of emissions, potential 
costs of climate change, and opportunities to become leading 
producers of environmentally sound goods and services, both 
India and China have emphasized the importance of developing 
and adopting GHG reduction and climate-change adaptation policies and have taken steps to do so. 
Each country’s “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution” (INDC), developed in connection 
with the Paris Agreement, lists various components of their respective climate-friendly plans. In 
these texts, initiatives aiming to (re)direct private sector activity figure prominently. 
IIAs pose risks to these actions. China and India have both indicated that they will pursue their 
climate policy objectives through measures such as imposition of taxes, removals of subsidies, and 
For countries such as China and India, 
for whom both the effects of climate 
change and the contributions of their industries 
are particularly notable, the challenges and 
opportunities presented by IIAs are heightened.”
TRADE IN THE BALANCE Reconciling Trade and Climate Policy        |         bu.edu/gegi      bu.edu/pardee        |         November 2016 56
adoption of new zoning restrictions. Notably, in other countries and similar contexts, such actions 
have given rise to ISDS claims. India and China are therefore likewise vulnerable as each country 
boasts a significant amount of foreign investment that could be aXected by these measures and has 
signed a large number of IIAs (China roughly 150 and India roughly 95) under which investors could 
potentially bring challenges. 
Not all of these IIAs, however, are the same (Berger, 2008). Up until the late 1990s, China’s IIAs 
provided only a relatively narrow set of protections to investors and limited access to ISDS. Yet 
over the past two decades, China has embarked on a program of negotiating treaties with stronger 
investor protections (though it still appears largely resistant to including restrictions on performance 
requirements), and greater access to ISDS. These shifts reflect China’s concern about the treatment 
of its growing number of investors abroad. 
In comparison, India’s IIAs have tended to provide broader investor protections and greater means 
to enforce them through ISDS. After being hit with a number of ISDS claims, however, India adopted 
a diXerent approach. In 2015, it adopted a new “model” text that, as compared to its previous IIA 
commitments, narrows investor protections, limits ISDS, and contains a number of provisions 
recognizing and protecting states’ rights to regulate in diXerent policy areas. Despite the preparation 
of this new model, it is still unclear as of mid-2016 whether India will actually conclude IIAs 
incorporating the model’s more defensive approach. Moreover, irrespective of what India does with 
its future treaties, the long lives (often multiple decades) and automatic renewal provisions of many 
IIAs mean that India will be subject to broad obligations under pre-2015 agreements for years to 
come. Even if India were to terminate those IIAs, their “survival clauses” typically provide that state 
parties will continue to be bound by the treaties’ obligations for a period of 10-20 years. China and 
India, therefore, will likely be vulnerable to ISDS claims and liability for at least the coming decades, 
which is the prime time for climate action. 
In terms of the opportunities China’s and India’s IIAs present for advancing climate policy objectives, 
some of the provisions suggested above by which state parties to an IIA commit to cooperate on 
investment in sustainable development can already be found in a few agreements concluded by 
China (Johnson and Sachs, 2015). Yet while promising, both China’s and India’s IIAs could do much 
more in terms of specifying relevant commitments and establishing institutions or mechanisms to 
ensure compliance. 
On the issue of excluding coverage for investments that are inconsistent with climate policy 
objectives, India’s model IIA contains analogous provisions denying IIA protections for certain 
projects based on investor misconduct. Denying coverage based on climate change risks and 
vulnerabilities is similar, but merely extends the grounds for exclusion. Nevertheless, neither India 
nor China presently have language in their IIAs that would preclude coverage for projects that 
exacerbate climate change challenges. 
The Future of the Investment Regime
There are fundamental questions about whether IIAs permit appropriate policy space for action 
on climate change or deter or undermine appropriate government measures. Moreover, there is 
concern that IIAs are agnostic toward the types of investment they cover, protecting investments 
irrespective of whether they exacerbate or help ameliorate mitigation and adaptation challenges. 
Consequently, not only are IIAs missing an opportunity to catalyze badly needed investment in 
support of climate action, they may also be facilitating—if not encouraging—entrenchment of 
unsustainable policies and practices. 
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These issues are especially salient for China and India as countries with significant numbers of IIAs 
and stocks of foreign investment, as well as a real interest in the climate agenda and important 
national plans to address climate change. In recent years, both countries have been altering their 
approaches toward IIAs; and there are some areas in which those new approaches can help reduce 
exposure to ISDS claims for mitigation or adaptation measures and/or help promote climate friendly 
investments. Nevertheless, much broader overhauls of IIAs are needed, both for those two countries 
and the parties to the thousands of other IIAs that exist or that are being negotiated. 
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